Monday, June 16, 2014

Leadership & Architecture


It's funny, just the other day, I was reminded of a Leadership and Architecture session from my recent residency at Gonzaga University while at Mermaid Winery, a local urban winery in Norfolk, VA.  Wine samples here are served on a vertical spiral where you start at the top with your white wines and finish at the bottom with reds.  Staring at my wine flight I couldn't help but make the connection of the downward spiral that the night would inevitably bring.  Seeing and seeing again, I guess.

All kidding aside, it took me some time to put this session into perspective.  For example, the Johari Window exercise was interesting, but seemed to me, somehow flawed.  Maybe if we all knew each other better, and if the list of adjectives were not provided (instead, we could think of them ourselves), it would give a more accurate picture of the public/private and blind self.  What I did take away from the exercise and from a subsequent conversation with fellow students at the hotel later that night, was the idea that many of us see ourselves much differently and often less positively than others see us.  Often, our fear of criticism inhibits our creativity.

I also found the presentation of the Casa Batlló to be quite interesting.  I feel that Antoni Gaudí's employment of a skeletal metaphor in his architecture may have been alluding to that of support (Familial support as well as structural support).  In this sense, we are seeing and seeing again what the architect may have intended.

Lastly, Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater suggested to me, that architecture, art, and leadership are often subjective.  How the architect described his motivation and intent compared to how others might view it is analogous to how a leader might lead and how his followers and others might view his or her style of leadership.  Wright's intent was that the waterfall not be observed, but be engaged with as he incorporated it into the design of the structure.  I, however, had a different experience upon first viewing.  I felt that the design of the house forces you to leave the house in order to enjoy its aesthetics.  If the house were located on the opposite bank, you would have been able to view it without leaving the comfort of the house.  Forcing the occupant to leave the house allows us to reaffirm our connection to nature and gets us out of our comfort zones.  This is what is so interesting about the human perspective.  It is the sum of our experiences that shape our view of the world around us.  

Saturday, June 7, 2014

Visit to Gonzaga University

I recently had the pleasure to visit the Gonzaga University campus in Spokane, Washington during my Masters of Organizational Leadership residency.

My first visit to the Pacific Northwest was outstanding.  The chance to meet the faculty and ask questions about the program was invaluable.
 
I believe that the best part of the experience was being able to meet with other graduate students to network and share our experiences.  The sessions (Leadership & Art; Leadership & History; Leadership & Architecture; Leadership & Creativity; Leadership & Film) were interesting, but I often found myself stretching to make the connection to organizational leadership.  I did, however, tend to find a connection between the sessions and the overarching theme of "seeing and seeing again". 

The Leadership and Art session was excellent.  Many of us work in highly technical (very left-brained) fields.  This session allowed us to break out of our comfort zones and into our (often poorly developed) creative sides.

I really enjoyed the instructor, Frankie White, who introduced the re-occurring intonation of “seeing and seeing again”, or pentimento as it applies in the art world.  This approach applies perspective to our normal problem solving process.  Many of us tend to solve problems the same way each time we see them, using a historical perspective as our mode of understanding an issue.  Using the creative process as a method of seeing and seeing again, we are able to augment our understanding and ability to solve complex problems. 

Overall, I believe the juice was worth the squeeze and would recommend the experience.  However, I do wish that the campus tour was a bit longer and more comprehensive.  

Monday, April 28, 2014

Globalization & Diversification

One of the dominant challenges of modern organizations is the rapid rate of globalization and its impact on workforce diversification.  The workplace is becoming more and more diverse as technology makes the world smaller and smaller.  Diversity brings with it the potential for cultural change.  Some organizations have already put in place cultural awareness training and other programs that help a previously homogeneous workforce better understand and communicate in a heterogeneous environment.

The Canadian International Development Agency’s pre-departure program (as cited in Conrad and Poole, 2005, p.389) touches on some excellent points that may be of great benefit in diversity/cultural training:
·         Communicating respect (in the language/behavior of the host society)
·         Being nonjudgmental (of others’ attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors)
·         Recognizing the influence of one’s own perceptions and knowledge
·         Being empathetic (trying to understand the other’s point of view and life situation)
·         Being flexible (being able to accomplish a task in a manner and time frame that is appropriate to the host culture and other’s needs)
·         Demonstrating reciprocal concern (actually listening and promoting shared communication)
·         Tolerating ambiguity, especially about cultural differences (p.389)

I feel that this list is an excellent method in which to approach both cultural change as well as life in general .

Cited:

Conrad, C., & Poole, M. S. (2005). Strategic organizational communication: in a global economy (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Friday, April 4, 2014

Critical Analysis: Organizational Silence

Critical Analysis:  Organizational Silence
By: Jody R. South

The purpose of this essay is to briefly summarize Bisel & Arterburn’s article entitled “Making Sense of Organizational Member’s Silence: A Sensemaking-Resource Model” (2012, pp. 217-226), including the authors’ intent and theory.  Further, the essay to follow shall endeavor to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the article as well as my personal, subjective opinions of the material as it is presented.

Intent and Theory

The major theme of the article was the sensemaking abilities of, and reasons for, employee reluctance to provide negative feedback to their managers and supervisors. Out of a sample of 226 adult employees, “180 (79.65%) were able to recall a situation in which they refrained from providing negative feedback” (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 219). Staff defended their quietness by employing both identity and expectation as sensemaking resources (p.219). Workers reasons for not reporting negative feedback are contained in the later portions of this paper. The article closes with a recommendation for further research into the causality of organizational silence (p. 224).
            
The article is rooted in several theories and philosophical perspectives which informed the authors’ research.  Among these perspectives are the frequency and commonality of employee reluctance to report issues to supervisory personnel (Perlow & Williams, 2003), as well as theories related to the type of issues that result in employee silence (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003).  Other perspectives include the possible consequences of delivering negative information (Withey & Cooper, 1989) and the ethics of employee silence (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008).
            
A theory postulated by Morrison and Milliken (2000) regarding the subtleties that lead to employee silence and how that silence thwarts organizational change, is a guiding concept that they employ throughout the article.  A large part of this theory centers on the possibility that corporate culture and sensemaking mutually affect each other (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).
            
The research performed by Bisel and Arterburn (2012) supplements the theory of Morrison and Milliken (2000) by studying how employees make sense of their decision to remain silent when presented with the opportunity to present negative feedback to management.  They then explain the procedure that they believe creates a silent culture.  The research question posed by the authors’ to those surveyed was as follows: “In what ways, do employees make sense of their decision to refrain from providing upward negative feedback to their supervisor, about their supervisor (i.e., remain silent)?”  (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 219).

Methodology

The methodology employed in the study included the subjective responses of the aforementioned sample of 226 employees, of which 180 “were able to recall a situation in which they refrained from providing negative upward feedback” (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 219).  The sample that included those employees who refrained from reporting negative information was comprised of roughly 65 percent females and 35 percent males, and an average of 40.86 years of age (p. 219).  These respondents were primarily based in one of 25 American states with the exception of a single Australian (p.219).  The experience level of the employees ranged from new employees to seasoned workers on the verge of retirement age who had zero to 45 years of experience in a supervisory role (p. 219). 
            
The methodologies employed to measure and investigate failure to report negative upward feedback included the recruitment of individuals from the researchers’ networks of professional contacts (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 219).  These workers were then instructed to solicit five of their professional contacts, and so forth, until the desired sample size was achieved (p. 219).  The individuals that agreed to participate in the study were then directed to take a survey over the Internet.  The survey included a permission form, a demographic questionnaire, an experiment, and lastly, the aforementioned research question (p.219).
            
The authors’ used a form of inductive, thematic data analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which was employed to isolate, evaluate, and note the major thematic data arrays.  Of the 180 responses to the research question, 213 reasons were cataloged (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 220).  Responses were then collected into two major sensemaking resource banks and five motivation categories (p.220).

Results

The five motivation categories and percentage of responses generated by thematic analysis included the following:
·         Predicting harm to themselves (70.42%)
·         Constructing the supervisor as responsible (13.62%)
·         Questioning their own expertise (5.63%)
·         Predicting supervisors’ deafness (5.63%)
·         Constructing timing as inopportune (4.69%) (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, pp. 219-220)
These motivation categories were sorted into two significant sensemaking sources to explain the respondents’ resolutions to remain silent: “perceptions of their own and the others’ identities and expectations about the future as informed by hierarchy” (p. 220). 
            
According to the data, the motivations for not communicating negative information vertically indicated that most affected employees fear that voicing negative information would have an adverse effect on them personally (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 220).  Fears included anxieties about managers terminating the employee’s employment, reducing their compensation, and diminishing the likelihood of future advancement prospects (p. 220).  These fears often originated from past experiences. 

Bisel and Arterburn (2012) noted that “although this study explores workers’ retrospective accounts, case studies would offer more contexts from which to understand organizational silence” (p. 224).  They proposed an auxiliary investigation of employee silence by reviewing case studies with the purpose of furthering comprehension of the factors that propagate a culture of silence (p.224).

Critique

I believe that the scope of the article was much too large for the manner in which it was conducted and reported.  Had the hypothesis of the study had been limited to a more constrained dataset (e.g. mid-western, United States citizens in white-collar professions, etc.), the results would have been refined enough to predict motivations for employee silence with reasonable confidence.  This report further failed to characterize deeper demographic data that might have influenced employee motivations.  Demographics such as race, religion, and education have the potential to impact the study and should be considered and reported.  Demographics could have been taken into account to study relationships between numerous combinations of employer/employee associations.  As an example, it might be useful to note the interactions between Asian, males, between the ages of 20 and 25, in white collar professions to female Indian supervisors between the ages of 50 and 55.  These deep datasets seem cumbersome, but are easily achievable through the use of relational databases. 
            
I further believe that, given the latitude of study, the sample size was much too small to produce the confidence intervals required for predicting the outcome of such a large population parameter.  The confidence interval should represent “values for the population parameter for which the difference between the parameter and the observed estimate is not statistically significant at the 10% level” (Cox & Hinkley, 1974, p.214).  Therefore, if the significance of the factor exists outside of a 90 percent confidence interval, then the probability of the event occurring by chance is less than or equal to 10 percent.

The authors’ believe that the findings of the study add to the previously noted studies by Morrison and Milliken (2003).  Further, they believe that their sensemaking-resource model is a groundbreaking structure for comprehending the “cultural expectations from which workers draw to justify their silence as a reasonable course of action” (Bisel & Arterburn, 2012, p. 224).  They also foresee their model employed to enlighten senior leadership on the subject of employee silence as well as to promote and encourage the constructive vertical criticism that successful organizations necessitate (p. 224).

The findings of this study, in my opinion, were largely predictable.  Some of the most interesting information that might have been extrapolated from the data was not presented by the authors.  For instance, Bisel and Arterburn (2012) noted, en passant, that those employees who refrained from reporting negative information was comprised of roughly 65 percent females and 35 percent males (p. 219).  What does the disproportional number women to men say about female silence in the workplace?  This subject alone would have made a more compelling, and more utilitarian study.

To end on a positive note, I appreciated the methodology in which the study participants were solicited, so long as the pool of candidates remained indicative of the intended population under study.  Further, as a prerequisite to understanding the authors’ methodology for reasoning, I enjoyed reading about the dissimilarity between inductive and deductive reasoning from adscititious sources external to this report (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1989).


References
Bisel, R. S., & Arterburn, E. N. (2012). Making sense of organizational members’ silence: A sense-making resource model. Communication Research Reports, 29(3), 217-226.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative
Research in Psychology, 3(2) (pp. 77-101).

Cox, D. R., & Hinkley, D. V. (1974). Theoretical statistics. London: Chapman and Hall.
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., Thagard, P. R. (1989). Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Morrison, E.W., & Milliken, F.J. (2000). Organizational Silence: A barrier to change and development in a pluralistic world. Academy of Management Review, 25, 706-725.
Miceli, M.P., Near, J.P., & Dworkin, T.M. (2008). Whistle-blowing in organizations. New York, NY: Routledge.
Milliken, F.J., Morrison, E.W., & Hewlin, P.F. (2003). An exploratory study of employee silence: Issues that employees don’t communicate upward and why. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 1453-1476.
Perlow, L., & Williams, S. (2003). Is silence killing your company? Harvard Business Review, 81, 52-58.

Withey, M.J., & Cooper, W.H. (1989). Predicting exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34, 521-539.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Literary review: Interpreting (the Work and the Talk of) Baseball: Perspectives on Ballpark Culture

            Interpreting (the Work and the Talk of) Baseball: Perspectives on Ballpark Culture (Trujillo, 1992) is a great example of ethnographic research.  The intent of the article was to convey that communications between major league baseball park employees generate and sustain three prevailing views of stadium culture:  “The ballpark as a site of capitalist work, as a community for symbolic family members, and as a theatre for social drama” (Trujillo, 1992, p. 350).  These interpretations are then further considered through the eyes of three groups:  romantics, functionalists, and critics.

            The author’s interpretive approaches “focus on the symbolic aspects of human and organizational life, revealing how interactants use symbols to make sense of their everyday experiences” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  Trujillo employed this approach by concentrating on the emphasis of the subjectivity, pluralism, and dynamism of the ballpark as an organization and deemphasizing objectivity, unity, and stability.  Ethnographically, the author considered both formal and casual communication practices of ballpark employees by collecting data through both observations and interviews over a period of two years.

            Through his study, Trujillo concluded, “there are at least three senses of baseball reality: the ideology of baseball as a business, the sociality of the baseball community, and the artistry of baseball as a drama” (Trujillo, 1992, p.364).  The author, having consulted subject matter experts, noted that the aforementioned schools of thought related to baseball “have different connotations depending on the world-views of those doing the interpreting” (Trujillo, p.364).  Therefore, due to dissimilarities in the human experience, opinions will vary from one person to the next.
            
Of the three frameworks employed by Trujillo, I believe that I most identify with that of the romanticist.  The author stated, “Romanticists interpret baseball in an ideal, even idyllic, way” (Trujillo, 1992, p.364).  To romantics, baseball is not so much about the business as it is about the feeling of community, artistry, and drama of the game.

            Functionalists, noted the author, “use sport to teach us about the realities of mainstream American culture and to demonstrate how sport helps us adapt to those realities” (Trujillo, 1992, p.365).  They consider baseball a metaphor for American business, human assimilation into society, and social values (Trujillo, p.365).
            
            The framework that appealed to me in the least was that of the critic.  Trujillo noted, “Critics argue that sport is one resource through which dominant groups in America promote hegemony” (1992, p.365).  Ever the cynic, the critic contends that baseball is more of a business than it is a sport. 
            
            The author believes that researchers should “interpret their data from the world-views of the romantic, the functionalist, and the critic” (Trujillo, 1992, p.366).  These perspectives expose realities that the interpretive researcher can employ to uncover multiple dimensions of an organization. 

            It was apparent that Trujillo relied solely on qualitative data in writing his article.  Downs and Adrian (2004) noted that the influence of both qualitative and quantitative data “make better interpretations by synthesizing all the data, and they produce richer, more detailed final reports” (p.42).  They go on to state, “In addition, they are less likely to gloss over contradictions between the two types of data” (p.42).  I feel that while the author did an excellent job or relaying his message, his methodology leaned heavily on quantitative research methodology and could have employed more quantitative research.  I did not find that the article was particularly earthshattering, nor has it impacted the way that I might view an organization.  Nevertheless, it did provide me with another excellent example of the importance of ethnographic research and assessment of organizational communications.

Cited:

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate life. London: Heinemann.

Downs, C. W., & Adrian, A. D. (2004). Assessing organizational communication: strategic communication audits. New York: Guilford Press.


Trujillo, N. (1992). Interpreting (the work and talk of) baseball: Perspectives on ballpark culture.             Western Journal of Communication, 56, 350-371.

Monday, February 24, 2014

Servant-Leadership: James Lovell of Apollo 13


Servant-Leadership:  James Lovell of Apollo 13
By: Jody R. South

This paper shall endeavor to analyze the leadership philosophy of James “Jim” Lovell, Jr. as portrayed by Thomas J. Hanks in the motion picture Apollo 13 (Howard & Grazer, 1995) and to compare his methodology to that of the philosophy of servant-leadership.  Furthermore, it is not the intent of the author to critique the leadership style the actual former NASA astronaut depicted in the aforementioned film.

Additionally, this paper shall consider the organization in which Lovell worked, some of the main characters that he interacted with, and the manifestation of servant-leadership as demonstrated in the plot and subplot.  Lastly, this review shall conclude by briefly examining Lovell’s developmental stage as framed by Torbert & Fisher’s developmental model of work and leadership (Fisher & Torbert, 1995).

Corporate Culture as a Catalyst for Servant-Leadership

In order to investigate the leadership practices of Hanks’ character it is important to consider the corporate culture of the institution in which he operated.  As a government agency, NASA is a very structured and organized organization with a clear division of labor as well as policies, procedures and systems that allow for a unified effort toward a common goal (Bolman and Deal, 2008, p. 15). 

NASA's missions are by no means short term projects and take many man-hours to complete their goals.  Each mission to the moon was planned for years and each member of the crew trained many hours as shown in the film.  Even though this specific mission was not successful, there was a clear goal and strategy placed behind the mission.  To add to this point, later in the film, NASA had to scrap the old mission to the Moon and instead start a new one - how to get the astronauts home.  Not an easy thing to do, as mission planning normally takes years.  However, NASA leadership demonstrated that they could remain relatively calm in the face of danger.  Ground-based mission control had to make a tough decision when they decided to close the reactant valves to the fuel cells, thereby aborting the moon landing phase of the mission.

In the film, NASA was mostly portrayed as an organization of trust.  During several instances (most notably in mission control during the initial failure and later during rescue mission planning) Gene, the Ground-Based Flight Director, had to trust key personnel and adopt their recommendations without further inquiry due to the time constraint. 

During the planning of the rescue mission, it was evident that NASA also had a culture of open communication.  All personnel expressed their concerns without regard of rank and file.  Leadership, however, was at all times in control and all voices silenced when the White team Flight Director, Gene Kranz spoke.
NASA was also portrayed as a team environment.  In an early scene, after a three hour training simulation, Mattingly noted that he would like to run through the simulator an additional time as he was not satisfied with his rate of turn and fuel burn.  Although the other astronauts noted that they needed to be well rested for another event, they operated as a team and agreed to reenter the simulation.  This showed a high degree of professionalism. 

Several events in the movie can be noted for their focus on interpersonal relationships.  NASA often functioned as an extended family for the astronauts and ground-based employees.  Like any typical family, employees of the agency were concerned with the welfare of its fellow members; and like any typical family, its members also shared frustrations and minor in-fighting as portrayed during the scenes where the flight surgeon expressed the need for crew rest in order to maintain crew health and to enable the crew to make sound decisions during critical portions of their return to Earth. 

CAPCOM 2. 13, we just got another request from the Flight Surgeon for you to get some                            sleep.  Don’t like these readings down here.
JAMES LOVELL. [Tearing off his biomeds] Let’s see how he likes this.  I am sick and                                               tired of the entire western world knowing how my kidneys are functioning!
DR. CHUCK. [after Lovell's heart rate flat lines] Flight, we just lost Lovell!
CAPCOM 2. 13, Houston. Jim, we just had a bottoming out on your biomeds.
JAMES LOVELL. I’m not wearing my biomeds.
CAPCOM 2. [after Gene Kranz shrugs it off] Ok, Jim.  Copy that.
                [Jack and Fred now tear away their own biomeds]
DR. CHUCK. [after all three crew members flat line] Flight, now I lost all three of them!
GENE KRANZ. It’s just a little medical mutiny, Doc.  I’m sure the boys are still with us.                                               Let’s cut them a little slack, ok?  (Howard & Grazer, 1995)

Here, we see that some in-fighting inevitably occurred later in the film when there was a minor rebellion when the astronauts removed their bio-sensors so that the flight surgeon would cease his requests for crew rest.  Lovell and Kranz each do their part to reduce the stress of the crew by removing unnecessary, low-priority distractions.

Jim Lovell:  A Servant-Leader in Space

Throughout the film, Lovell, commander of the 1970 Apollo lunar mission, faced several leadership challenges, the majority of which were well orchestrated.  One such leadership challenge occurred early in the scenes of the movie when the flight surgeon grounded Ken Mattingly, the originally slated mission pilot, as it was believed that Mattingly had contracted the measles.  Jim Lovell, as the mission commander, had to make a difficult decision, continue to prepare for the mission with the back-up pilot, Jack Swiggart, or scrap the mission in hopes of a future mission.  Ultimately, the mission commander had to make the call to remove the pilot from the crew and continue to train for the launch. 

Jack’s initial failures in the simulator did not go a long way to restoring team confidence in his ability to pilot the mission.  However, Lovell defended Jack, saying “If I had a dollar for every time they killed me in this thing, I wouldn’t have to work for you” (Howard & Grazer, 1995).  Again, the Mission Commander had to make a choice.  Would they be a fully trained team in only two days’ time, or should they scrub the mission in hopes of a future mission?  In the end, it is difficult to tell if the reorganization of the crew affected mission performance in this situation as Mattingly never showed signs of contracting the virus, and the fact that the issues encountered on the mission were chiefly due to mechanical failures.  The initial mission of landing on the Moon was a failure.  It should be noted, however, that the restructured mission of returning safely to Earth was a huge success.

Lovell’s leadership style might best be described with the action logic of “The Achiever” in Torbert and Fisher’s developmental model of work and leadership (Fisher & Torbert, 1995) as evidenced by his ability to create a positive work environment while meeting both personal goals and the strategic goals of his organization.  Achievers, while an intermediate action logic along Torbert & Fisher’s continuum (1995), are highly goal oriented. 

They value effectiveness in the pursuit of goals and results much more than mere   technical efficiency and are able to recognize and allow for exceptions and contingencies.  They have a deep sense of responsibility, which can sometimes make them appear excessively duty bound, but they are keenly aware of the consequences of their actions and may go to significant lengths to avoid hurting others.  They are conscientious [and] show initiative (Thompson, 2000, P.128).
As an “Achiever”, Lovell’s ability to unite his crew under intense pressure allowed his team to operate with élan.

Conclusion

          The movie Apollo 13 has many characters that embody the philosophy of servant-leadership.
[T]he film is […] about the role communication plays in leadership, a subject both Kranz and Lovell appear to have thought through carefully.  By squelching intra-office and   intra-capsule arguments, never sharing incomplete or alarmist data, and maintaining a constant verbal -- and emotional -- lifeline between those on the ground and those off it, they maintain maximum control in a chaotic situation.  That, in turn, inspires confidence among both crews.  It's a crucial point: leaders certainly desire loyalty and passion, but if they fail to win their followers' confidence first, well, failure is not an option (Hofman, n.d).
Communication under pressure is paramount.  Lovell and his crew did an excellent job of communicating with ground-based mission control throughout the film.
           
           The ability to prioritize is another leadership quality that both Lovell and NASA were quite proficient.  When the time came to make the decision to abort the mission, it was made quickly and decisively in order to save the crew of Apollo 13.   

Lovell’s Servant-Leadership abilities were reinforced by NASA’s corporate culture of trust, open communication, and team work.  Throughout the film and throughout the mission, Lovell displayed characteristics of a servant-leader.  His leadership was exemplified in both his decision-making process, his genuine empathy, and the measures he took to not only protect his own live but those of his crew. 

 References

Bolman, L. G. & Deal, T.E. (2008). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice and leadership. (4th edition). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Fisher, D., and Torbert, W. R. (1995). Personal and organizational transformations. London: McGraw-Hill.

Hofman, M. (n.d.). Everything I Know about Leadership, I Learned From the Movies. Inc.com. Retrieved February 13, 2014, from http://www.inc.com/magazine/20000301/17290.html

Howard, R. (Director), Grazer, B. (Producer). (1995). Apollo 13 [Motion picture]. United States of America: Universal Pictures.

Thompson, C. M. (2000). The congruent life: following the inward path to fulfilling work and inspired leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Friday, February 14, 2014

Entrepreneur.com: Leading as a Servant

Somewhere in my research for an ORGL paper this month, I ran across a great article on Entrepreneur.com. Check it out if you get a chance: http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/231242#